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Abstract: 
 
In this paper it is argued that, in an economy with heavy loans such as Greece, structural 
reforms are not enough to lead the country out of the crisis. Only a Grexit with deep cuts and 
restructuring of debts, together with efficient state management and development policies 
may lead to growth. Greece has fallen in a huge debt trap which is perpetually growing by 
new loans.  
 
A little less than half of these loans have been created during the euro zone period and 
particularly after the 2008 crisis. In accordance with the Eurogroup agreements, Greece is 
obliged to pay every year to its lenders 15% of its GDP (27 billion euro) up to the year of 
2023 and 20% of its GDP (36 billion), between the years 2023 and 2060.  No country in the 
world can survive under such a heavy burden of debt obligations. It is argued that, even a 
country with heavy loans such as Greece, can succeed growth by imposing structural 
reforms such as sweeping impediments of labour, goods and service markets, breaking 
business and union monopoly power, make it easy to fire unwanted employees, removing 
regulations, red tape and licensing fees, privatizing state assets, increasing taxes and 
suppressing pensions etc.  
 
This is nothing but a totally false hypothesis. It has been illustrated in research that, 
structural reforms may provide in the long run a yearly growth of a little over 1%. It is also 
found that, they do not increase output during a crisis and they might have negative effects in 
the medium run. Thus, in the case of Greece, only deep cuts and restructuring of the debt (as 
with the German debt in the London 1953 agreement), accompanied with Grexit, 
development policies, efficient state management and reasonable structural reforms, may 
lead to the way out of the crisis and to growth. 
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1. Introduction 
      
During the post war period, Greece witnessed a satisfactory and even impressive 
economic development with years of high growth followed by short periods of 
stagnation, and ever since the mid-seventies, it has entered the club of the developed 
countries. Greece entered the European Union in 1980 and the euro zone in 2002 
under a climate of euphoria, looking towards even better days. In the beginning of 
the euro years during 2002-2008, the country lived in a non-productive affluence - a 
false paradise with an enormous expansion of loans, both state and private. European 
banks, mainly German and French, where wide open to Greek state loans, most of 
which were directed to the purchase of imported goods from the same countries and 
for armament from the west. Private banks also where competing in offering the 
most attractive loan terms almost without any guarantee.  
 
In fact, they were pushing people and businessmen to become their lenders.  In 2008 
the international crisis hit like a thunderstorm the country. Then under Berlin’s 
guidelines, the euro zone imposed upon Greece extreme deflationary policies that 
created a vicious circle of deep recession. The lenders asked for their money back 
and since the debtor could not pay, they provided new loans. The country was 
trapped; the Modern Greek Tragedy had been born. (Rogoff, K. 2015; Negreponti-
Delivani, M. 2014; Thalassinos et al., 2010; 2015; 2014; Thalassinos and Dafnos, 
2015; Thalassinos and Stamatopoulos, 2015; Thalassinos, 2008; Thalassinos, 2014).  
 
After its entrance in the euro zone instead of better days, the once affluent Greece 
became a poor relative of Europe and a beggar of new loans. The huge burden of the 
ever-increasing debts, the overvalued euro and restrictive economic policies, led the 
country to a vicious circle of recession with no end and hopes of inversion.   
 
Despite, austerity measures and the haircut of 2011 (PSI)2, mainly financed by 
Greek pension funds, state and local organizations, Universities and private 
bondholders (Bevan, 2012), the enormous Greek debt continues to rise. From € 
303.5 billion or 157% of the GDP in 2012, it soared to € 323 billion or about 180% 
of the GDP by the end 2016.  
 
It is argued that the Greek debt has been inherited from the past because of bad and 
corrupt state management. Yes, part of the blame may be related to the malpractices 
of the Greek political system. But we must not forget that, the same political system, 
                                                          
2The euro zone authorities in their session of 21/8/2011, decided the implementation in 
Greece of  the so-called Private Sector Involvement (P.S.I ), which implies payments for the 
public debt with inflows from the private sector ( bonds belonging to Social Security and 
Public Organizations, Local Government, Universities,private bondholders etc). The term 
PSI has been firstly used for the restructuring of the public debts of Russia, Turkey, 
Argentina, Ecuador, Brazil.   
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also to be found in many other countries, existed also in the past during the previous 
150 years of the drachma years. 
 
Histogram 1. Average Annual Growth of GDP in Greece, the GIPSI, the euro zone 
and the rest of the world 
 
Source: World Bank, The Global Outlook, 2016. Own elaboration of analytical data of all 
countries internationally. Latvia and Lithuania have not been included in the above 
calculations as euro zone countries, because they entered in the euro area in 2014 and 2015 
respectively. The so-called GIPSI are Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland.  
 
Although there were several economic crises and bankruptcies in the country’s 
economic history, (Deo et al., 2011), as in many other countries. None one 
remembers a deep and long catastrophe like the one witnessed today.  Moreover, in 
the same declivity trend, although to a lesser extent, Greece is followed by Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, Ireland. (Weeks, 2013). But also, the whole euro zone is not doing 
well, crawling at the bottom of world economic development (Histogram I). 
Moreover, in accordance with Eurostat data, the debt as a percentage to the GDP 
was doubled in other peripheral countries between 2008-2015. Apart from Greece 
where it jumped from 120% to 181% of the GDP, in Ireland climbed from 47% to 
89%, in Portugal from   82%  to 149%, in Italy  from  112%  to 157 and  in Cyprus  
from  55%  to 110%. Above all in Spain it was tripled since it rose from   47%   to 
117% of the GDP. 
 
This widely spread saying that the Greek debt has been inherited from the past is a 
cunning myth. According to Eurostat data, the debt as a percentage of the GDP, has 
almost doubled after the 2008, during the euro zone years. (Histogram 2). In other 
words, the Greek debt created during the euro zone years, almost equals the total 
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debts of the past 150 years (which have been going through cuts and restructuring, 
an arrangement not accepted within the euro). 
 
Histogram 2. Evolution of the Greek debt as a percentage of the GDP 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
There is also another important point. If the Greek debt was enormous as said before 
the year 2002, how could Greece be accepted in the euro zone where a main 
prerequisite for such an entrance is an acceptable level of debt less than 60-80%? 
 
The debt trap is destroying the Greek economy and keeps the country under an 
economic and political occupation. New loans are given to the Greek government to 
pay older loans and this has no end. In May 2016, the European School of 
Management and Technology (ESMT) based in Berlin, published a research report 
providing a descriptive analysis of where the Greek bailout money went since 2010 
(Rocholl, A., Stahmer, A., ESMT, 2016). Out of the 220 billion euro disbursed to 
Greece since the beginning of the economic crisis about 95% (210,3 billion euro ) 
has gone mainly to German and French banks and less than 5% (9.7 billion euro) 
went into the state budget for the benefit of Greek citizens (Histogram III). More 
analytically, apart from the above sum of 9,7 billion, 86.9 billion euro (46,67%) of 
the bailout money went to repay old debts, 52.3 billion euro (28,08%) for payment 
of interest, and 37.3 billion euro (20,03%) for the recapitalization of Greek Banks. In 
the latter case, this was necessary because of the large escape of capital abroad - a 
fact also related to the malfunction of the euro zone. 
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Histogram 3. Estimations for the distribution of euro loans to Greece before 2015 
 
Source: European School of Management and Technology, Berlin 
 
These findings were assumed and discussed but few knew as a fact, yet now they are 
confirmed by the above verified study. As stated in the same study, “for six years 
there are attempts to stop the Greek crisis with tougher measures and loans that 
require new loans to pay back the older ones. The cause of the failure is less in the 
side of the Greek government and more in the design of assistance programs. These 
calculations are raising doubts about the proper design of assistance programs, 
since the loans serviced debts, although Greece is the 2010 de facto bankrupt. The 
salvation of Greek banks proved disastrous for taxpayers. Overall, they channelled 
37.3 billion euro in Greek banks from the two aid packages. But the aid is fully 
diminished. After the recapitalization by the PSI of 2012 the banks have lost almost 
98% of their value in the stock market. Moreover, the resulting risk transfer from the 
private to the public sector and the subsequent risk transfer within the public sector 
from international organizations such as the ECB and the IMF to European rescue 
mechanisms such as the ESM, still constitute the most important challenge for the 
goal to achieve a sustainable fiscal situation in Greece”3.   After the agreement with 
the lenders in the summer of 2015, and the decisions of the two Eurogroups of July 
2016 and June 2017, the debt trap became even bigger. After 2015, all new loans 
                                                          
3  The ex-Prime Minister of Italy, Massimo D’ Alema in a revealing interview to Skyptg in 
6/8/2015 pointed out that “. €220bn out of the €250bn of aid to Greece has gone directly to 
the German, French and Italian banks, as interest paid to the lenders. In reality, when we 
say that we’re paying the Greeks’ pensions, that’s not true – no, we’re paying the German 
banks. It goes a roundabout way, yes, it does a little trip, but the Greeks don’t even get a 
whiff of it. This mechanism cannot last for any length of time – it is not working and will not 
work”. 
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will be used to pay back older loans and there is much more burden to that as we 
will discuss further on.  
 
2. The economic deadlock 
 
The Greek GDP has fallen more than 25% since 2008, and this dramatic drop has no 
parallel in length in history (Histogram IV). Moreover, the Greek households lost 
40% of their wealth between 2009-2014. (Charalampakis, 2017). Greece has become 
a European champion in unemployment rising to unprecedented levels of 23%-25%, 
and youth unemployment to approximately 62%. As a result, more than 500.000 
Greeks, most of them young, emigrated abroad in the last five years. All economic 
indicators (GDP, unemployment, investments, industrial production, construction, 
etc), move with a monotonous downward trend (The World Bank Factbook, 2016, 
IMF Economic Outlook, 2016, ELSTAT).  
 
Inflation moves at a negative pace of 1-2% and this is extremely negative for growth 
and the burden of debts. Not only the public, but also private debts have increased 
dramatically. More than one in two businesses fails to service their loans, tax and 
insurance obligations. Overall arrears to the Greek Income Revenue Service (IRS) 
are growing sharply now surpass 215 billion by mid-2017, that is 120% of GDP. 
More than half of the total of 5.8 million taxpayers owe to the IRS. Many millions of 
debts are also owed to businessmen and pensioners by the State which always 
postpones its payments obligations to present a better budget. The only positive sign 
was the equilibrium and/or the surplus in the State budget and the balance of 
payments, mainly due to the deep drop of imported oil prices and large cuts in public 
expenditure, which turn leads to more recession. 
 
Histogram 4. Evolution on GDP (selected countries) 
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Continuously expanding is the number of uninsured citizens and entrepreneurs. The 
pension funds, wounded with the haircut of their reserves from the PSI in 2011, are 
sinking (Bevan 2012). Their deficits are growing sharply and this results to huge 
cuts in all kinds of pensions. The economy is drying up and contracting more.  The 
extreme recession policies, the huge levels of unemployment, the excessive 
compression of labor rewards and of pensions, are both inhumane, and uneconomic. 
They lead to a large drop of domestic demand with dangerous economic and social 
consequences.  Recession creates more recession lowers the business circle and the 
tax base. Poverty creates more poverty, misery, hate and upheaval. Loans lead to 
more loans and dependency – a perpetual cycle4. Mainly due to the overvalued euro, 
the lack of currency liquidity and the high interest rates of loans for business 
transactions, the country’s poor competitiveness is dying.  Recession cannot be 
beaten with more recessionary policies, an overvalued currency and without a 
generous development plan (Krugman, 2012). Over the long term, this is 
burdensome to all, even for Greece’s lenders. These policies are totally wrong. They 
are not the outcome of logic. And common logic is what we need today 
 
3. The negative influence of the euro   
 
Τhe overvalued euro is a costume that does not fit peripheral economies based on 
labor intensive economies. It mainly favours countries that create high technology 
and innovation products, those with capital and technology intensive economies. For 
instance, when a product such as a new effective medicine safeguards its patent and 
cannot be copied for at least 20 years, its production cost may be trivial, but its sale 
price is extremely high. This allows for an absurd profit margin, since the labor and 
raw materials cost is significantly low. A modern magnetic resonance tomograph for 
example, one made by Siemens, is so expensive because its purchase is considered 
necessary in the global market. This is true for its spare parts and maintenance as 
well.  Conversely, Greece, even though its immense human-scientific potential has 
migrated abroad, maintains tourism and agriculture as its main production 
orientation which require a labor intensive production process. Therefore, a 
significant amount of workforce is needed but unable to reduce its cost below a 
certain point, so as the total production cost to be lower or equal to that of our 
competitors.  
      
Moreover, the cost of living in neighbour countries is much lower. In other words, 
the purchasing power of 25 euro in Greece corresponds to 12-15 euro in Turkey or 
Bulgaria. The charge for a hotel room in Greece, due to the high exchange rate of the 
euro compared to other currencies, is almost double than in Turkey, Egypt, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Hungary. Even the lowest-paid worker in tourism and agriculture, Greek 
or immigrant, costs far more, since they get paid in euro, than a worker in some 
                                                          
4 Menandros an ancient Greek philosopher has said that ,”loans make slaves the human 
beings”. 
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other country who gets paid in a devaluated currency. The fact that, Bulgaria belongs 
to the EU but not to the euro zone and has its own devaluated currency with a very 
friendly tax system, has led many thousands of Greek companies to transfer there. 
Greek pensioners are also moving to Bulgaria, because their extremely low pension 
in euro has an increased purchasing power there. Numerous Greek consumers who 
reside near the borders with Albania, FYROM, Bulgaria and Turkey go on one-day 
trips to these countries to buy low-cost products of any kind. As Simon Johnson 
(2015) points out, the underlying problem in the euro area is the exchange rate 
system itself – the fact that “these euro zone countries locked themselves into an 
initial exchange rate, i.e., the relative price of their currencies, and promised never 
to change that exchange rate. This amounted to a very big bet that their economies 
would converge in productivity – that the Greeks (and others in what we now call 
the “periphery”) would, in effect, become more like the Germans”. 
 
4. The extreme policies of the Eurogroup 
 
Every year, successive Greek governments, the European Commission, the IMF, 
announce optimistic forecasts for the future trends of the Greek economy. These 
forecasts, also called as “the success story”, are always refuted in the end. The IMF 
accepted that it was wrong with its initial predictions concerning mainly the 
country’s multiplier (I.M.F., 2013, Spiegel & Harding, 2013, Blanchar, 2015). Yet, 
the lesson was not learned. Under Berlin guidelines, the euro zone decision makers   
insist in the same policy of catastrophe. The Eurogroup session of 15 June 2017 
concluded with the following monstrous decision that was mostly hidden from the 
wider public.  
 
«The Eurogroup welcomes the commitment of Greece to maintain a primary surplus 
of 3.5% of GDP until 2023 and thereafter a fiscal trajectory that is consistent with 
its commitments under the European fiscal framework, which would be achieved 
according to the analysis of the European Commission with a primary surplus of 
equal to or above but close to 2% of GDP in the period from 2023 to 2060. The 
Eurogroup concluded that debt sustainability should be attained within the 
framework of the debt measures envisaged by the Eurogroup in May 2016. In this 
regard, the Eurogroup recalled the assessment of debt sustainability with reference 
to the agreed benchmarks for gross financing needs: GFN should remain below 15% 
of GDP in the medium term and below 20% of GDP thereafter to ensure that debt 
remains on a sustained downward path». 
    
The debt trap was thus completed, and the country is seemingly held under a modern 
economic occupation for the next 43 years. With this Eurogroup decision, (which 
was a prerequisite for a necessary new loan of 8 billion euro for the payment of 
precious loans), Greece has been obliged to present a yearly budget surplus of 3,5% 
(6 billion euro) paid to the lenders. Overall, it should pay 15% (27 billion) of its 
GDP up to year 2023 and 20% (36 billion) up to 2060.  It is obvious that, such huge 
loan liabilities are impossible to be met not only by a destroyed economy such as 
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that of Greece but even by prosperous states like Sweeden, Germany, Canada etc. 
Since this is out of discussion, it appears that the lenders’ plan B is to acquire part of 
such funds by the establishment of the Superfand which already functions under 
their command. In this Superfand  all state property of the country will be included 
for 99 years5. The loss of funds from public property to be owned by the Superfand 
and to be sold, will deprive the Greek state budget from the influx of precious 
income and thus, new budget deficits will arise.  
 
This combined with the ever more extreme austerity measures policies imposed by 
the Eurogroup, will lead to further shrinkage of the economic cycle and to deeper 
recession.   It is an undeniable truth that Greece’s colossal debt is not sustainable; a 
fact that is understood even by first year students of economics. This recession 
spiralling is irreversible and not any illusion of fake optimism can reverse it. Insofar 
the country is completely controlled by the distorted euro zone with the overvalued 
euro and harsh recession policy enforced, along with the disease of the fierce 
modern stock market capital; there is no possibility for the Greek economy to 
recover from the coma of destruction that has been trapped in. The ever-renewed 
forecasts for economic recovery are more near to a science fiction scenario. It is hard 
to believe that the economic downhill of the Greek economy, can miraculously be 
averted. Because, to put it simply, no such miracles can happen. 
 
5. The German debts to Greece for war loans and compensations  
 
On February 23rd1953, the London agreement was signed in to write off the huge 
German debt resulting from the two world wars. Some 70 countries had claims 
against Germany both before the war, and the post war period. The conventional 
total debt of Germany, pre-war and post-war without counting the war reparations 
and compensation, amounted to 38.8 billion marks. In accordance with the London 
Agreement, this debt was deleted by 62.6% and the repayment of the remaining 
scheduled to be paid in 10 to 30 years, with an interest rate of 0% -5%. The first five 
years, starting in 1953, the debt would be paid without interest and debt payments 
should not exceed 5% of Germany's income from exports.  
 
Thus, Germany was required to repay the rest of the debt, while maintaining a level 
of development to meet its obligations and to concurrently improve the standard of 
living of its people. In addition, if the fulfilment of these conditions exceeded its true 
potential, it would be reconsidered with individual negotiations. With these 
arrangements, the repayment of German debt (estimated to about 600% of the GDP), 
made possible much earlier than planned. After full implementation of the plan in 
1958, the debt fell to 6% of GDP and in 1960 Germany was exempted from 
                                                          
5 The Superfand named “Greek Company of Partnership and Estate” basically controlled by 
the lenders, acquires for 99 years all state property such as ports, air ports, state land, 
buildings, hotels touristic  real estate, state companies of electricity, petroleum ,gas, water, 
civil transport,  railways etc. 
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amortization obligations. The London Agreement was modelled under sound debt 
settlement logic and became a reference point for the poor and heavily indebted 
countries.  Greece, which took part in the London Agreement did not collect war 
loans and reparations from four years of harsh occupation by German troops during 
the years 1940 to 1945, which resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths and huge 
logistical disasters.  
 
Today, these remedies-compensation, are estimated by the Bank of Greece at 108.43 
billion euro, without interest. The occupation loan, amounting to 3.5 billion dollars, 
is estimated at 54 billion euro, without interest. In accordance with other estimates, 
these amounts are much larger, even higher than 160 billion euro in current prices. 
As foreseen in the agreement, part of the debt and war compensations would be paid 
to Greece with the reunification of Eastern and Western Germany. When the 
German Union integrated into a single state in 1990, the conference agreed by the 
London Agreement on this issue, never took place.  Germany considered and 
considers that, an agreement on the reunification has no legal status Peace Treaty; it 
paid only some minimal compensation of 70 million to war victims that claimed the 
matter in international courts and hurried to close the matter. Since then, Germany 
has steadfastly refused to reopen this can of worms. The German government argued 
that, any plausible bill would exceed the country's resources, and that continued 
financial co-operation in Europe instead would be infinitely preferable.  
 
Professor Albert Ritschl of the London School of Economics in an outspoken 
interview to Spiegel6  points out that “Germany is king when it comes to debt. 
Calculated based on the amount of losses compared to economic performance, 
Germany was the biggest debt transgressor of the 20th century. In the 20th century, 
Germany started two world wars, the second of which was conducted as a war of 
annihilation and extermination, and subsequently its enemies waived its reparations 
payments completely or to a considerable extent. No one in Greece has forgotten 
that Germany owes its economic prosperity to the grace of other nations. The 
German bankruptcies in the last century show that the sensible thing to do now 
would be to have a real reduction of the debt. Anyone who has lent money to Greece 
would then have to give up a considerable part of what they were owed. Some banks 
would not be able to cope with that, so there would have to be new aid programs. 
For Germany, this could be expensive, but we will have to pay either way. At least 
Greece would then have the chance to start over”. 
 
Wolfgang Schäuble, the German Minister of the Economy was asked why he insists 
on imposing very hard economic burdens upon Greece, while Germany refuses to 
pay its own debts and war compensations derived from two world wars. He 
answered simply by saying “these where different times”. 
                                                          
6 Interview of Albert Ritschl to Yasmin El-Sharif in in Spiegel on line International,21 June 
2011.  
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6. The myth of structural reforms 
 
Dani Rodrik (2015) describes structural reforms as improvements in regulation and 
institutions to enhance efficiency with which markets operate, reducing transaction 
costs of market activity, product and service markets: licensing fees and other costs, 
labour markets: hiring/firing costs, reducing entry barriers, eliminating monopolies, 
enhancing the role of private sector over government, improved public sector 
administration, e.g., tax collection, rule of law. According to the OECD, labour 
market structural reforms include: (i) simplification of dismissal procedures, (ii) 
increased flexibility in working-time regulations, and (iii) enhancing firms' wage-
setting flexibility. Examples of product market structural reforms consist of: (i) 
privatisation programmes of state-owned enterprises, (ii) stricter competition laws, 
and (iii) removing barriers to entry in professional services.  
 
A common definition of structural reforms includes the modernization of public 
administration, the effective management of the wider state, the abolishment of 
professional labour and market privileges and monopolies, the promotion of 
innovation, the proper treatment of tax evasion, the widening of tax base, 
privatization, deregulation and liberalization. A wider interpretation of the term 
however includes deep cuts in pensions, wage, incomes and labour conditions. The 
European Commission which strongly supports structural reforms, relates them with 
a wide range of measures including actions to promote growth and create more jobs, 
fiscal responsibility, investment and structural reforms and in particular: 
 
• make labour markets more adaptable and responsive; 
• liberalize service sectors, boost competition in product and service markets, 
specific sectors, or improve overall business environment; 
• encourage innovation; 
• improve the quality of public taxation systems; 
• address the challenges of population ageing on the welfare state. 
 
Behind such well written sentences, lies the wider interpretation of the term, 
pointing toward pension and wage cuts, as well as including the abolishment of basic 
labour conditions. The neoliberals insist that, structural reforms tackle obstacles to 
the fundamental drivers of growth by liberalising labour, product and service 
markets, thereby encouraging job creation and investment, improving productivity, 
boosting the economy’s competitiveness, growth potential and adjustment capacity. 
The euro zone supporters are in love with this hypothesis. They insist with passion 
that; structural reform is the only key to growth and prosperity. So, Greece must 
inherit this lonesome road to jump out of the crisis.  
 
Every program imposed upon the Greek economy by its creditors since the financial 
crisis in 2008 has been held together by a central conceit: that structural reforms, 
conceived boldly and implemented without slippage, would bring about rapid 
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economic recovery. The European Commission, the European Central Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, all anticipated that fiscal austerity and structural 
reforms would result in a compensatory boost to the Greek economy. For the last 
eight years, Greece has been a very good pupil indeed.  Successive Greek 
Governments inherited the deepest the wildest structural reforms in comparison with 
other European countries together with extreme recessionary economic policies. As 
a result, from 2010 to 2015, Greece climbed nearly 40 places in the World Banks’s 
business-environment rankings. Its responsiveness to structural reforms 
recommendations remains highest amongst other euro zone members (see Histogram 
V).  Despite this, the country’s debt is still unsustainably high, with the economy 
being deeply sick up to present days. Strict monetary and austerity policies and 
structural reforms implemented until now have succeeded to practically nothing. 
They transformed a rather wealthy country to a poor state and created immense pain 
for the people. The Modern Greek Tragedy appears to have no end. 
 
Histogram 5. Change in OECD responsiveness to structural reforms 
recommendations 
 
Source: OECD and David Pothier, (2014) 
 
Several studies concerning the outcome of implementing structural reforms around 
the world—particularly in Latin America and Eastern Europe since 1990—have 
shown very poor results. It has been found that, privatization, deregulation and 
liberalization typically produce growth in the longer term at best a little over 1% 
(Bouis and Duval, OECD; Buis, et al. 2012). In the short-run, effects are often 
negative especially when slack in the economy is large. Anderson et al. (2014) has 
found that, weak demand conditions could dampen the short-run impact of structural 
reform, and in some cases, structural reforms initiated in weaker initial demand 
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conditions have very little positive and possibly negative impact on growth and 
employment even in the medium run (Anderson et al., 2013).  
 
Moreover, Eggertsson et al. (2014) show that, structural reform does not increase 
output during a crisis. Their simulation also shows that structural reform may have 
negative impact when strict monetary policies are active. Anna Rose et al., in an 
International Monetary Fund research paper ascertain that “Some structural reforms 
may not achieve the desired improvements, having small or even negative effects in 
depressed economies. By reducing the uncertainty and sustaining aggregate demand 
during the reform episode, supportive macroeconomic policies can increase the 
positive effects of reforms on macroeconomic outcomes. This supports the view that 
some structural reforms are best initiated in conjunction with supportive fiscal or 
monetary policy if policy space is available” (Rose, A., Bordon, A., Ebeke, Ch. and 
Shirono, K. 2016).  
 
Out of many researchers that have searched the impact of structural reforms, only 
Hobza and Mourre (2010) support that structural reforms could boost real GDP 
growth from 1.7 percent to 2.2 percent between 2010 and 2020, depending on the 
depth of the reforms. Yet even if we accept their findings, one wonders if this rate of 
growth is enough to pull out of the crisis a destroyed economy such as that of 
Greece.    
 
As Paul Krugman (2013) put it, “such policies are nothing more than a red herring 
distracting policymakers from the real underlying cause of the Eurozone's economic 
woes, namely the chronic shortfall of aggregate demand”7. In the case of Greece, 
restricted monetary policies together with structural reforms imposed has been a 
total failure. The statistics, the numbers, the reality, the whole picture speak for 
themselves. Overall, we may accept that, certain structural reforms such as the 
rationalization of public administration the combat of tax evasion and corruption, the 
promotion of innovation are no doubt necessary for the country's progress. But even 
with the most successful of such reforms, the country will not survive under the 
siege of a debt trap, extreme austerity policies and an overvalued euro. 
 
7. Conclusion: The way out 
 
In front of the deadlock, the only solution appears to be a structured and friendly 
Grexit, accompanied by a controlled bankruptcy, suspension of debt payments (as 
                                                          
7Paul Krugman adds to that by saying “OK, let’s be clear: I’m in favor of structural reform 
(as long as it’s the right kind of reform). I’m also in favor of peace, kindness, and good 
coffee for everyone. But when I see influential people calling for structural reform as the 
universal answer to all economic problems, I get angry. Hence my morning ire at the 
OECD”. 
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best illustrated by German loans in the London 1953 Agreement), and negotiations 
for cutting the debt and extending its repayment period. Structural reforms should 
concentrate in improving state management, eliminate corruption and tax evasion 
and reorganizing the social security system on a logical basis. During the initial 
negotiation days, the government must be ready to provide liquidity to the economy 
through the issuing of non-interest state bonds at a ratio of 1:1 in relation to the euro 
(Bootle, 2012).  Existing capital controls and the recent widespread transactions with 
electronic money through the banks, will be helpful for the same cause. Being able 
to immediately provide liquidity to the Greek economy is crucial for affective 
bargaining with the lenders, who could not extort deals by threatening to halt the 
supply of money, as they currently do.  
 
Yet, Greece should not recklessly raise its demands and expectations, ignoring the 
lenders’ geopolitical predominance. To say the least, at such negotiations Greece 
will not be held at gunpoint. But it must not overvalue its own position. The next 
step is the issuing of the new drachma devaluated at 25% in relation to the euro, as a 
necessary precondition for regaining the lost competitiveness of the economy Thus, 
one drachma will equal 0,75 euro. The euro may continue to be used as a parallel 
currency for a period decided in accordance with the result of negotiations and 
economic trends. In practice, the existence of a parallel currency is today a common 
practice in many countries worldwide and in Europe as well. Following this initial 
period, which may last less than a year, it is expected that the economy will regain 
its lost competitiveness and move towards growth. The annual growth of GDP, 
wages, pensions and income in general may reach 5-7%, a soaring increase in 
employment will create over 1.4 million job positions, and unemployment can 
recede below 10%. 
 
Care should be taken to avoid hyperinflation which constitutes the main, if not the 
only risk of transitioning. Today, less than 50% of the economy’s productive 
capacity is been used and inflation moves at a negative pace. This leads to artificial 
growth of the loan payments and creates conditions of extreme recession. Therefore, 
a controlled heating of the economy is needed, if it will not lead to extreme and not 
easy to control conditions (Katsinos and Mariolis, 2012; Chionis, 2015). In any case, 
the dangers of hyperinflation may be avoided if the amount of new drachma 
produced will not exceed a certain level of the M2 of no more than 20-30% of the 
GDP (36-54 million euro). Moreover, increases in wages, pensions and incomes in 
general, may follow and not proceed the GDP growth. So, under the above policies 
guidelines and considering that imports constitute about 25% of the country’s GDP, 
we have estimated that, inflation shall be sustained below 8-10% during the initial 
stage and afterwards, may fall below 6% (Katsanevas, 2016).  
 
There shall be no issue of goods sufficiency regarding basic necessities, such as 
food, medicines, raw materials or fuels, a fact that is further guaranteed by the 
current surplus in the balance of payments. Banks shall be recapitalized using 
national currency under state control. Bank deposits and debts in euro will be 
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protected through their conversion to new drachmas, at a dr/euro rate 1:0,75, hence 
covering the devaluation of the new drachma by 25%.  
 
This basically means that a 75.000euro deposit will equal 100.000 new drachmas 
and so on. Regarding mortgage loans, special provision should be taken under a 
main policy umbrella and in accordance with cases. Tactical bad debtors who, on a 
regular basis deliberately avoid making payments upon their loans, shall be subject 
to legal proceedings. Low and medium incomes may be increased eventually, in 
relation with labor productivity and GDP growth trends.  Government spending 
restrictions, the combat of corruption, impunity, bureaucracy, tax evasion and the 
strengthening of productive investments, are also necessary. The Greek economy 
must be cleared from the pathetic syndrome of the “import country” that depends 
upon loans, reactivate its production basis, try to consume no more than it produces, 
abolish malpractices of the past and make a healthy new beginning towards the 
future.  
 
Among other measures, there is a need to upgrade the national healthcare and 
welfare system, the enhancement of families with three or more children, the 
employment of the young and of redundant middle-aged employees. Emerging 
technologies, modern antagonist industry, pharmaceutical and medical industry and 
services, internationalization of Greek Universities, shipyards, agriculture and 
livestock raising should be promoted as major development pillars. Greek ancient 
heritage, culture, music, theatre and arts in general, should be supported. Research 
and innovation should be also strongly encouraged, as well as quality tourism, 
predominantly quality and maritime tourism. Incentives will be offered for attracting 
Greek shipping owners to be registered under the Greek flag and transferring their 
registered office in Piraeus.  
 
After eight years of destruction, it has become obvious that the debt trap coupled 
with the overvalued euro, with austerity policies imposed by the euro zone, is 
financially sliding down the chasm of catastrophe, with no hope of recovery. A 
friendly Grexit as was briefly described above, with a generous cut of the county’s 
debt, together with development policies and reasonable structural reforms, is the 
only applicable way out of this tragedy.  
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